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DERRIDA’S QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL INTERWEAVING
OF INVENTION AND INTERPRETATION
In both flPsyche: Inventions of the Other,«
which stresses the flparadoxical predicaments«
in which the concept flinvention« remains tied
up, and flUlysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in
Joyce,« which focuses on the related aporetics
of interpretation, Derrida’s multiple deconstruc-
tive performances uncover the aporias that be-
set the traditional and seemingly obvious rela-
tionship of priority between invention and in-
terpretation that governs, for example, Kant’s
analysis of the relationship between taste and
genius. As I hope to show in what follows,
Derrida demonstrates both that invention
strictly speaking is ruined by interpretation, just
as interpretation strictly speaking, is ruined by
invention. One cannot demarcate a domain for
the one that is not always already contaminated
by the other, and this mutual contamination
means that both flinvention« and flinterpreta-
tion« cannot become entirely true to their con-
cepts. That is, both invention and interpretation
strictu sensu are impossible. Derrida’s way of
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Abstract — Résumé
thinking, therefore, demonstrates that there is
no logically coherent basis for the invention/
convention distinction that is all too often used
to support the traditional belief that a musicolo-
gist’s sole task is merely the second-level ana-
lytical interpretation of musical compositions
already so inventively brought into being by
artists. This is an attitude that neatly excludes
musicology from the domain of cultural produc-
tion, which, it is often supposed, absolves the
discipline of the responsibility for cultural cri-
tique at the coalface, as it were. In my view, then,
the importance of Derrida’s pattern of thinking
for critical musicology has to do with its power
to address the dangers of ideological blindness
that are the result of placing musicologists and/
or artists strictly on opposite sides of the inven-
tion-convention coin.
Key Words: Derrida; deconstruction;
quasi-transcendental logic; economic/aneco-
nomic invention; interpretation.
It seems natural enough to say that the many interpretations of artworks come
after the works themselves, and remain parasitic upon them. This order of priority
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depends on the apparently clear distinction between an essentially conventional
hermeneutic process and an essentially inventive creative process, marked, for
example, by Kant’s distinction between taste and genius. In his terms (1987:311):1
flJudging beautiful objects to be such requires taste; but fine art itself, i.e., production
of such objects, requires genius.« This distinction, which divides interpretation
from invention along seemingly clear, intuitively correct, and rather obvious lines
of demarcation, in fact shelters a complex network of highly suspect (Derrida would
say fldeconstructible«) oppositions.2  Without opening the Pandora’s box of Kant’s
aesthetics too wide, I wish only to suggest here (and implicitly to anticipate the
relevance of Derrida’s deconstruction of it) that it is still predominantly this dis-
tinction that orders the relations between so-called flcreative« artists and musi-
cologists.3
I should add that Kant’s distinction between taste and genius applies only in
the domain of aesthetics. For him, theoretical (determinative) and aesthetic (reflec-
tive or teleological) judgments are not of the same order, since it is the rational
faculty of understanding that legislates in the a priori construction of theoretical
knowledge, while the affective faculty of judgement legislates in the invention and
judgment of beauty in artworks (and, by analogy, the invention and judgment of
teleological order in the empirical flsciences«). Kant insisted that the empirically
given could only be judged aesthetically (that is, brought a posteriori under intel-
lectually formed concepts of what things are meant to be), and his scrutiny of aes-
thetic judgement in his Third Critique, serves as a propaedeutic for his examination
of the empirical (as opposed to theoretical) sciences. The analogy between judg-
ments of taste in art and of teleological order in empirical science is indicated in
the etymology of the word flaesthetic,« which is derived from the Greek aisthētikos
(from aisthanomai), which means to flperceive.« This analogy, however, depends
on the now questionable equivalence of fine art and beauty, and the association of
beauty with formal purposiveness: that is, a projected, organic orderliness whereby
the perceived form of something harmonizes with its conceptual essence (what it
is meant to be).
1 Page references are to the Akademie edition.
2 Besides distinguishing art from science via such oppositions as those between intuition and
intellect, immediacy and reflection, inspiration and argument, Kant’s distinction between taste and
genius harbours, inter alia, the oppositions between invention and convention, nature and culture, the
originary-original and derivative-imitation composites, as well as teknè (intentional artifice) and chance.
3 In the exposition that follows I shall avoid the term flcreative,« despite its common usage. As
Derrida points out, the determination of flinvention« has historically vacillated between fldiscovery«
and flproduction,« and has never been thought of as creation ex nihilo, which is traditionally reserved
for a god. In his words (1989:47): flTo invent is to reach the point of finding, discovering, unveiling,
producing for the first time a thing, which can be an artifact but which in any case could already be there
existing in a virtual or invisible state. The first time of invention never creates an existence.« See also
Derrida (1989:43, 49, 63).
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These reflective, aesthetic judgments, then, concern truth not as knowledge,
but as beauty (which Kant defines as a projected, or flhoped for« orderliness with-
out order). Correspondingly, for Kant, taste, or the faculty of aesthetic judgment,
is a power to feel or sense the harmony between a thing’s purposiveness (a tele-
ological ideal projected by means of understanding and reason), and its form (per-
ceived via the senses and imagination). Aesthetic interpretation, then, as a matter
of taste, draws upon a sense of aesthetic flrightness.« To show taste, one must have
mastered the rules that properly determine what a thing is meant to be in order to
recognise a projected ideal as presented in an aesthetic idea. Further, one must be
able to perceive the essential material form of the artwork, and judge whether or
not this form harmonizes with the ideal presented. Taste, for Kant, which is an
fleconomic« matter of sensing order or harmony, of judging whether or not some-
thing belongs, or is in the right place, can be cultivated and improved with prac-
tice.
In contrast, Kant (1987:308) describes invention in fine art (for him, the only
possible invention) as the product of genius, described as a naturally given talent
that cannot be induced through learning. He distinguishes the genius of the artist
who produces inspired, original (and fine) art; the great mind of the scientist, whose
work is by definition never original; and the simpleton (the mere technician) who
flcan never do more than just learn and imitate.« If the capacity for both theoretical
science and technology is a matter of having the flskill for something that can be
learned by following some rule or other,« the capacity for genius, in contrast, in-
volves originality (KANT 1987:307-308). The path of genius, then, does not follow
existing patterns. Instead, a genius invents what was not flthere« before, or, at least,
discovers what was not yet visible to anyone else, in the form of a projected aes-
thetic idea. According to Kant’s conception, then, invention, as the gift of genius or
inspiration (but, interestingly, not luck or chance), is flaneconomic.«
(Before I continue, I should place between parentheses, to draw attention to it,
the distinction I have just touched upon between the fleconomic« and the
flaneconomic,« since Derrida’s quasi-transcendental thinking, as should become
apparent later, turns upon the relation of mutual contamination between these
two terms. In outline, Derrida’s thinking turns on the argument that the constitu-
tion of any economy, any closed or regulated system, in any domain, necessarily
goes hand in hand with the suppression of the flaneconomic,« or that which in
relation to a system remains errant, dis-ordered, resistant, aleatory, unexpected, or
nonsensical. Any kind of constitution or institution, therefore, cannot avoid the
violence of exclusion. For this reason, much as any system may aim to be com-
plete, whole or total, the very gesture of drawing up some kind of encircling bor-
derline, or settling upon limiting conditions for inclusion, has already made such
totalisation impossible. In short, what is necessary to constitute a regulated sys-
tem, namely the exclusion of nonsense, simultaneously, and paradoxically, en-
sures that it remains incomplete.)
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Kant does not consign genius wholly to the sphere of the aneconomic. He
admits that, flnonsense too can be original,« and adds, therefore, that an artwork
will not be fine unless its genius is disciplined or cultured by taste. In other words,
taste (aesthetic knowledge) on the part of the artist is certainly presupposed as a
necessary condition for the production of fine art. But it remains insufficient: if
fine art presupposes the rules of taste, it is not in principle derived from any rule
that can be learned and imitated. Kant (1987:307), then, describes genius as fla tal-
ent for producing something for which no determinate rule can be given.« Yet,
although the works of genius are not themselves produced through obedient rule
following, or patient imitation, they must become exemplary; they must serve oth-
ers as new models for imitation, or as the new standard or rule by which to make
aesthetic judgements. In short, while it is itself protected from any pre-existing or
traditional economy, artistic genius invents the new aesthetic economy or disposi-
tion to be followed by others to come. Thus, if there is no genius without taste, one
can, as an interpreter or critic, display taste (follow the contemporary standard)
without having the further attribute of artistic talent or genius.
On Kant’s account, then, musicology as a discipline would firstly be, not theo-
retical (or determinative), but interpretative. It would be a matter of aesthetic taste
rather than of scientific knowledge, since it deals with aesthetic conventions, rather
than hard and fast laws. Secondly, musicology would come after the invention of
the music. Although it may serve to guide lesser, imitative artisans in the produc-
tion of academically correct works, it would not have the power, in principle, to
prescribe to the musical genius, or control what an inventive composer may or
may not do. For musicology to claim either the status of a science, or any kind of
prescriptive power over genius, would, on Kant’s account, simply be a matter of
hubris.
Without necessarily denying this conclusion, Derrida’s deconstructive, or
quasi-transcendental, thinking nevertheless works to unsettle Kant’s distinction
between taste and genius, and, therefore, the order of the relation between inven-
tion and interpretation. But this, as is all too often alleged, is by no means simply to
reverse polarities and prioritise the previously disadvantaged. It is just such sim-
plistic binary thinking that inspires the contradictory misreadings of his work. On
the one hand, having mistakenly redesigned flinterpretation« (in Derrida’s name)
to mean creative flsigning« rather than reiterative flcountersigning,« some readers
view his writing as the unrestricted freeplay of pure literary invention. Others, on
the other hand, go to the opposite extreme in suggesting that Derrida’s work, as
merely non-inventive interpretation, says nothing new at all. Such readers insist
that it is simply his obfuscating style that unnecessarily makes flexoticisms« out of
perfectly ordinary statements.
I hope, as a side effect of the exposition that follows, to dispute this common
misinterpretation that grounds such relentless attempts to place Derrida’s think-
ing on one side (usually the lunatic) of one or another binary opposition; that be-
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tween, say, foundationalist and anti-foundationalist thinking, genuine philosophy
and literary genius, theory and artifice, truth and fiction, and so on. Derrida’s think-
ing is nothing like the freeplay postmodernism rightly decried by philosophers of
different persuasions, without being amenable to recuperation by systems of so-
called pure philosophy either.
Instead, in both flPsyche: Inventions of the Other« (1989), which stresses the
flparadoxical predicaments« in which the concept flinvention« remains tied up,
and flUlysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce« (1991), which focuses on the
related aporetics of interpretation, Derrida’s multiple deconstructive performances
uncover the aporias that beset the seemingly obvious relationship of priority be-
tween invention and interpretation. Through the pattern of quasi-transcendental
thinking that challenges all binary thinking, as I hope to show, Derrida demon-
strates both that invention strictly speaking is ruined by interpretation, just as in-
terpretation strictly speaking, is ruined by invention. One cannot demarcate a do-
main for the one that is not always already contaminated by the other, and this
mutual contamination means that both flinvention« and flinterpretation« cannot
become entirely true to their concepts. That is, both invention and interpretation
strictu sensu are impossible — without this being enough to give up on the neces-
sity for either. I shall conclude with some indication of why it may be important or
interesting for musicologists to read Derrida on this topic.
The Impossibility of Invention
flInvention« was itself invented. As Derrida (1989:25-26) points out, its Latin
roots, flmark the construction of the concept and the history of its problematics.«
Moreover, this concept is periodically reinvented. If, for Cicero, inventive power,
distinguished from and related to disposition and elocution, consisted in discov-
ering things or ideas, it was reinvented by Kant as an unveiling that was strictly
the work of genius in fine art; by Schelling who advanced the idea that philosophy
too could and should be the poetic invention of new forms (DERRIDA 1989:58); by
Leibniz, flat the dawn of what we might call technoscientific and philosophical
‘modernity,’« as the inventive production of truth through the flprogrammed ma-
trices« of method, which has been reiterated lately by technoscience as the produc-
tion of machines (DERRIDA 1989:46-48). According to Derrida (1989:32, 47), this
history marks an overall shift in determining the concept flinvention,« from flin-
ventive discovery« to flproductive discovery,« or, one could say, from its anecono-
mic to its economic sense.
Cicero, Derrida notes, insisted that invention must be distinguished from dis-
position, since invention involves the discovery of things, while disposition in-
volves positioning or arranging them. Moreover, the things discovered (ideas,
themes, objects, substances) must be distinguished from the verbal forms used
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subsequently to speak about them. Finally, while disposition applies across this
divide between things and words (both things and verbal forms can be located in
respective articulated systems), flinvention« does not.  In Derrida’s words
(1989:26), flinvention is ‘properly’ applied to ideas, to the things one is talking
about, and not to elocution or verbal forms.« Supposedly, since language as an
articulated system of basic syntactical rules is always already there, the clear ex-
pression of an invention (the sphere of elocution), is a non-inventive matter of
purely dispositional economy (system, placement, order, organisation). From out
of the materials already at one’s disposal, one puts together the discursive form
most appropriate for the expression and communication of a novel idea (an in-
vention). As Derrida (1989:26) puts it, flwe now have in place one of the most
traditional philosophical topoi,« in which one is left with an invention-disposi-
tion pairing for things, and an elocution-disposition pairing for words. Reiterat-
ing this traditional distinction, Kant reserves flinvention« for the discovery of
aesthetic ideas, while the material articulation of the idea in the work itself, the
technique of its production (the arrangement or disposition of colours, shapes,
notes, etc.) would be a matter of taste.
Unlike the elocution-disposition complex, the invention-disposition complex
is traditionally thought of as oppositional. As mentioned earlier, unlike flcreation,«
artistic invention amounts to either uncovering for the first time something al-
ready there, but previously unrecognised, or discovering something novel by
putting together existing entities in a new way. The earlier aneconomic sense of
invention tended towards the passive. Invention, in Derrida’s words (1989:46), flwas
represented as an erratic occurrence, the effect of an individual stroke of genius or
of unpredictable luck.« On this account, some or other flcontent« would come to a
genius through unpredictable revelation or inspiration (rather than as the effect of
systematic research, experimentation, or intentional programming, which was con-
strued as purely a matter of disposition). But, as Derrida (1989:46) will show, this
purely aneconomic determination of the concept, indicates fla misunderstanding,
unequally shared, of the real constraints on invention.«
Granting, then, that flthe real constraints on invention« must be taken into
account, invention was gradually reinvented in more active, economic (or
dispositional) terms, to the extent that the concept today refers predominantly to
flproductive« rather than flinventive« discovery. In this case, invention is thought
of less readily as the uncovering of hidden flcontent,« and more readily as flthe
productive discovery of an apparatus that we can call technical in the broad sense,
technoscientific or techno poetic.« That is, invention becomes the invention of
machines or methods that, once discovered, may flprogram« the production of
more inventions (DERRIDA 1989:47-49). Derrida’s hypothesis, then, is that across
the board there has been a historical reduction of the aneconomic sense of inven-
tion to the economic. Today, in his words (1989:32),
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there are only two major types of authorized examples for invention. On the one hand,
people invent stories (fictional or fabulous), and on the other they invent machines,
technical devices or mechanisms in the broadest sense of the word.« In both cases,
invention is seen as production: flFabula or fictio on the one hand, and on the other teknè,
epistémè, istoria, methodos, i.e., art or know-how, knowledge and research, information,
procedure, etc.
The philosophical roots of this economic conception of invention may be traced
to flmodernist« thinkers like Leibniz and Descartes, who both envisaged the in-
vention of a fluniversal characteristics« (a system of universal scientific or linguis-
tic symbols, or musical notation, that would be independent of any natural lan-
guage), which, even if it presupposed the discovery of true flcontent« (to be organ-
ised), was intended to produce a new science, or that is, to foster invention (DERRIDA
1989:54-55). For Leibniz, a fluniversal characteristics« would not only be a
dispositional aid (the laying out of a syntax or system) for organising what we
already knew, but it would be a productive flform« that could help us perceive
what was missing in our knowledge, invent the means to find it, and eliminate
controversy. Here, then, the discovery of truths would be programmable through
logico-discursive mechanisms or methods, which are invented artefacts in which
the effects of chance would be factored in by probability calculations in order to
ensure the repeatability of truth (DERRIDA 1989:56-57). As Derrida (1989:46) notes,
invention, whether in fine art or technoscience, would be subject to flpowerful
movements of authoritarian prescription and anticipation of the widest variety.«
In this case, the role of the inventor, in Derrida’s words (1989:55), is, flnot to fall
upon the truth by chance, but, as it were, to know chance, to know how to be
lucky, to recognise the chance for chance, to anticipate a chance, decipher it, grasp
it, inscribe it on the chart of the necessary and turn a throw of the dice into work.«
The danger is obvious: Leibniz’s claim for his fluniversal characteristics« —
which flgives words to the languages, numbers to arithmetic, notes to music,
and…teaches us the secret of determining rational argument« — is that it flsaves
the mind and the imagination, the use of which must above all be controlled«
(DERRIDA, 1989:57). In trying to predict and control what comes to us as inven-
tion, would we not have lost the sense of inventiveness altogether? As Derrida
(1989:46) asks, can we still call a programmed invention an invention? flIs it an
event through which the future (l’avenir) comes to us?«
One might be tempted, then, to fldream of reinventing invention on the far
side of the programmed matrices,« or, that is, to insist that the older, aneconomic,
largely excluded sense of invention, which preserves a moment of chance or
unpredictability, must be recovered for the concept. It seems commonsensical that,
in Derrida’s words (1989:41), flwhen it erupts, the inaugural invention ought to
overflow, overlook, transgress, negate…the status that people would have wanted
to assign to it or grant it in advance.« But, as he warns, flthings are not so simple«:
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one cannot simply revert to this aneconomic sense of invention, since invention
understood in this sense is just as impossible as invention thought of purely in
terms of economy.
Derrida’s elaboration of this claim in flPsyche« packs in enough inventive
power to make summary laughable. I acknowledge in advance, with a guilty smile,
that I shall simply pull a thread or two from it to uncover the pattern of quasi-
transcendental thinking that is repeatedly performed throughout the text. Such
performances turn on the claim that one unavoidably determines certain concepts
in incompatible economic and aneconomic registers. Concerning flinvention,« these
registers span a complex network of interrelated distinctions, such as those be-
tween: invention and disposition; genius and taste; originality and repetition; con-
vention, event and advent; chance and method; institution as creation or construc-
tion; the possible and the impossible.
To the question of the proper register for determination of the concept flin-
vention,« the answer remains undecidable. In each distinction considered, Derrida
shows that the economic and aneconomic registers cannot be distinguished rigor-
ously. Yet, they also cannot be harmonized, dialectically interwoven, or organised
into a hierarchy or teleology in which one is subsumed under the priority and
governance of the other. Nor can one register be reduced out of the picture alto-
gether in favour of the other. In other words, one cannot form a unified concept of
invention. Either way, then, as aneconomic or as economic, invention strictly speak-
ing is impossible.
Accordingly, the pattern of Derrida’s argument runs roughly as follows: For
an invention to claim uniqueness, that is, to conform to the concept flinvention,« it
must occur as an inaugurating flevent«: either as a flash of inspiration or revela-
tion, in which something original-originary occurs for the first time, or as a singu-
lar, transgressive moment that shakes the debris of past convention. Moreover, the
uniqueness or novelty of invention requires that this first time is also a last time.
As Derrida notes (1989:29), flarchaeology and eschatology acknowledge each other
here in the irony of the one and only instant.« We are tempted, therefore, to think
that there will be no invention unless there is a break with convention; that inven-
tion denotes a moment in which flthe same« (shorthand for that which is already
given and has a recognised status as conventional, rule-governed, or ordered) must
be transgressed, and something flother« (new, original, unpredictable, unique, dis-
ruptive) comes to light. In brief, the conditions of the possibility of invention would
be: genius, singularity, originality, unpredictability and transgression.
On the other hand, flinvention of the other,« as the opening in which the other
flspeaks« for the first time, may also be construed as a more or less direct concern
with flinvention« as allegory. Etymologically flallegory« derives from the Greek
allos, which means flother,« and agoria, which means flspeaking« (DERRIDA,
1989:26). The question, therefore, concerning the temporality of invention would
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be this: Can the other speak (does invention occur), in an atemporal, original-
originary flash of inspiration, or must it occur as narrative, in which case it must
have a past and a future, and, importantly, a relation to the words convention,
advent and adventure?
The answer is undecidable:4  If one must think of inventive novelty in terms of
an aneconomic flone and only instant,« this necessity finds itself already compli-
cated by the figure of allegory. As Derrida points out, the word flevent« itself bears
traces of temporal relativity. Firstly, concerning the temporal mode of the past, the
flevent« of invention makes sense not as a unique instant, but only in relation to
flconvention« (as a tradition of possibilities already instituted and ready to be trans-
gressed). An invention receives its status (becomes what it is, as original or trans-
gressive) only if it is flprotected by a system of conventions that will ensure for it at
the same time its recording in a common history, its belonging to a culture: to a
heritage, a lineage, a pedagogical tradition, a discipline, a chain of generations.«
Secondly, since an invention must be valid for the future,« invention bears the
traces of fladvent.« In Derrida’s words, to become what it is, invention flwill also
need the signature or the countersignature of the other« (the future interpreters) as
if this flcountersignature bore the legitimating authority.«
In other words, as Derrida notes, any flinventor« faces the paradox of always
already having had to flsign-away« the originality of an invention, of having to
presuppose the numerous conventions implied in making something at all, and in
making it public (fla contract, consensus, promise, commitment, institution, law,
legality, legitimation«), in order for it to be recognised as original. Invention, then,
cannot be the wholesale transgression of status or an opening-out to the entirely
novel. Rather, it relies on the rule-governed structures of flthe same« both to flsign
as« an inventive proposition, and to be recognised as such. But, if flevent,« finally,
is also associated with the idea of fladventure« or narrative as an open-ended story
in which the unexpected may happen, then, in the unforeseeable time-to-come,
the power of recognition may or may not constitute the event as invention (as the
inauguration of a possibility that will remain at the disposal of everyone).
Paradoxically, then, an invention must claim uniqueness fleven if« in Derrida’s
words, flthe uniqueness has to be repeatable,« since an invention never takes place
without convention, advent or adventure. If flinvention begins by being suscepti-
ble to repetition, exploitation, reinscription,« it can be neither the ephemeral insig-
nificance of a one and only chance instant, nor entertain its own destruction as the
predictable effect of a conventional past and the advent of a programmable future.
Invention, in either sense, is impossible.
4 As Derrida (1989:28-29) notes, there is a verbal collusion here that, whether adventurous or
conventional, must at least make us think; namely, flthe convergence of several modes of coming or of
venue, the enigmatic collusion of invenire and inventio, of event, of advent, of future or time-to-come (in
French, avenir), of adventure, and of convention.«
168 A. HURST: DERRIDA’S QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL..., IRASM 36 (2005) 1, 159-178
To put the predicament in other terms (DERRIDA 1989:59-60): For an inven-
tion to live up to its aneconomic definition as an original-originary transgression
of the possible, that which was not possible beforehand (the absolute other, the
impossible) has to come to the inventor. Otherwise the invention only makes ex-
plicit what was already possible, if veiled, within the economy of flthe same.« But
this coming of the absolute other is in principle impossible. As soon as that which
is other to possibility comes to the inventor it changes status — it becomes possi-
ble. Thus it never really was impossible. Derrida argues, then, that pure originary-
originality, defined as openness to absolute otherness is impossible. Thus if by
definition, flinvention of the other« as absolute transgression, or as breaking all the
rules, must be invention of what was not previously possible, or invention of the
absolutely novel, and if this could be the only possible invention, then invention
would be impossible.
It seems, then, that its opposite, flinvention of the same« (we can invent only
what was apparently impossible, but really possible), must be the only possible
kind of invention. But, as already noted, invention as programmable discovery of
what is already possible seems also to have lost its sense as invention.
If its aneconomic and economic registers likewise make invention strictly im-
possible, how may one dream of reinventing invention? It can only be done, Derrida
(1989:44-46) insists, through flquestions and deconstructive performances« that
sharpen its enigma and resist the reduction of its essential ambivalence to one or
another clear-cut meaning for the sake of a flprogrammatics of inventions.« His
reinvention of the concept invention, therefore, will have been to uncover its truth
as its inability to rigorously separate, unify or reduce its co-existing, competing
meanings (DERRIDA 1989:49). This reinvention of invention leaves us in the
aporetic predicament of having discovered that invention is a self-undermining,
or auto-deconstructing, concept whose sense irremediably vacillates between si-
multaneous but competing registers, between which a choice is impossible.
The inventiveness of Derrida’s own text is, accordingly, to unsettle, or re-in-
vent, the concept flinvention« by calling it deconstruction. One should note here
that he explicitly rejects the one-sided conflation of deconstruction and the trans-
gressive, disruptive, aneconomic sense of flinvention,« insisting that the move-
ment of deconstruction is flfar from being limited to the negative or destructuring
forms often naively attributed to it« (DERRIDA 1989:42). In other words, if
deconstruction is flinventive« it will have to be so in a way that is neither aneconomic
nor economic.
For example, he demonstrates, contra Cicero, that an unsettling dis-position
of discursive forms can be eminently inventive, citing Ponge’s Fable as an exem-
plar for such deconstructive inventiveness (DERRIDA 1989:30-41).5  While studi-
5 This, incidentally, mimics Heidegger’s penchant for demonstrating how elocutionary emphasis
unsettles the sense of a sentence.
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ously respectful of grammatical conventions, the first line of this poem — flBy the
word by commences then this text« — unsettles all of the traditional linguistic
distinctions that mark the difference between the performative and the constative,
use and mention, invention and repetition (description, recounting, quotation),
telling and told, event and narration, because it is simultaneously all of these. Ponge,
for example, performs the commencement of the text by describing this commence-
ment, and this description is already a citation. From the start, Fable involves a
flplay with the places in language,« which demands respect for the conventions of
grammar (disposition) to function at all. Yet, in its very respect for linguistic con-
ventions, Fable uncovers their essential instability (DERRIDA, 1989:59-60). This
unsettling constitutes, for Derrida, the inventive power of Fable: it flproduces« not
something, but an opening or dehiscence in flthe same,« which invites the unpre-
dictable happening of the other.
 flFable gives itself then, by itself, by herself, a patent of invention« (DERRIDA,
1989:36). To the extent that Ponge’s Fable is an exemplar that gives the rule to
deconstruction, it represents inventive genius in exactly Kant’s sense. The prob-
lem is that it also simultaneously upsets the traditional distinction between dispo-
sition and invention (upon which Kant’s taste-genius distinction depends), because
its inventiveness consists precisely in its disposition.6  Like Fable, the inventive power
of deconstruction does not consist in breaking all the rules in order to produce
novel contents or ideas flout of the blue.« It does not flinvent the other« in this
sense. Rather, deconstruction can be inventive, Derrida insists, precisely because
the deconstructive event is never purely aneconomic.
But if invention therefore occurs through deconstructive disposition, it goes
hand in hand with an understanding of disposition that is resistant to the kind of
systematic disposition (mechanism, programme, method, language) that puts the
throw of a dice flto work.« This, in turn, is by no means to suggest that deconstructive
disposition is the precise opposite of system. Deconstructive thinking does not
escape the orders and repetitions of convention, which is necessary to confirm
even its status as the disruption of status, or as being beyond any possible status.
Nevertheless, deconstruction, Derrida (1989:55) insists, is not a method and it does
not operate according to the distinction between method and chance. Rather, it
makes discursive moves, which open flthe same« in preparation for the unpredict-
able coming of the other, within a narrative whose ending we cannot foresee or
programme in advance. In Derrida’s words (1989:60),
6 Derrida (1989:27) goes on to show that the imprecision of this borderline between the aneconomic
(invention-disposition) and the economic (elocution-disposition), is reiterated in the sphere of contem-
porary law. If invention is ideally reserved for things or ideas, then, Derrida notes, it would be interest-
ing to ask why, in the domain of the arts, legislation concerning an author’s or inventor’s proprietary
rights takes account not of ideas — flAs for ‘ideas,’ they belong to everyone; universal in their essence,
they could not ground a property right« — but only of compositional form.
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if the other is precisely what is not invented…deconstructive inventiveness can con-
sist only in opening, in uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures so as to
allow for the passage toward the other. But one does not make the other come, one lets
it come by preparing for its coming.
The inventiveness of deconstruction consists not in the flinvention of the other«
(as the positive invention of an entirely novel idea, system, mechanism or method),
but in uncovering the essential ambivalence in flthe same.« Since it is premised on
the insistence that what flis there« is inherently conflicted, self-undermining or
auto-deconstructing, deconstructive invention does not happen in a flash, but is
always already under way. It consists precisely in bringing to light the self-unset-
tling of what is ostensibly already settled; in uncovering the inherent disorder
always already at work/play in the orders of the instituted; or in achieving a
displacement within the bounds of conventional positioning. Reiterating what
occurs in Fable, the inventiveness of deconstruction consists in producing an in-
stability or opening within the already instituted, in preparation for the unpre-
dictable happening of the other, which lets the other come, not simply by chance,
but also without prediction or programme. Such preparation for the coming of
the other is not passive: it is not flinertia open to anything whatever« (DERRIDA
1989:55). In other words, for Derrida, deconstructive invention means getting ready
for an fladventure,« or dreaming of and preparing for an impossibility (the incal-
culable chance coming of an entirely other that escapes programming and a hori-
zon of anticipation). This is not to suggest that it is possible to find the other in
any positive sense — quite the contrary. Deconstructive preparation serves as a
reminder that to close, closet, stabilise within the bounds of the already possible
is always to have excluded something, or to have covered over discrepancies,
which makes such closure temporary at best. The coming of the other, or its com-
ing back is not invented, even if you might need inventiveness to prepare to wel-
come it (DERRIDA 1989:60).
In sum, Derrida’s primary question in this essay concerns how invention can
be something flother« than its reduction to one or another of its incompatible reg-
isters, since each, taken alone, makes invention impossible. Challenging the com-
mon assumption that there is a contradiction between deconstruction and inven-
tion, all of this serves, ultimately, to answer the question of the sense in which
deconstruction, as impossible (as without method, system or status), is the only
possible invention (DERRIDA 1989:36, 42, 48, 60-62).
And I would say that deconstruction loses nothing from admitting that it is
impossible…For a deconstructive operation, possibility would rather be the danger,
the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, acces-
sible approaches« (DERRIDA 1989:36).
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The Impossibility of Interpretation
In flUlysses,« Derrida again performs the very thing that the text is about,
making summary an impossible task. Nevertheless, with the help of this essay,
and accepting the necessity and burden of violation, I shall now turn to flthe other
side« of the invention-interpretation complex, to address in more detail one of the
implications of Derrida’s reinvention of invention already touched upon in the
foregoing exposition: namely that the interpreter as much as the inventor invents
the invention. Derrida elaborates on this paradox in flUlysses« by showing that
what he calls the second, interpretative flyes« co-constitutes the first inventive flyes.«
To put this in the lean (or malnourished, if you like) terms of quasi-transcendental
thinking: The condition of the possibility of the original invention is its recognition
by an interpreter; but this condition makes an original strictly speaking impossi-
ble. By the same token, the condition of the possibility of the interpretation is the
gift, the giving out, of the original invention; but this very inventive originality
makes interpretation strictly speaking (interpretation as getting to the heart or core
of a text, or, therefore, as exactly replicating the essence of the original) impossible.
As a guiding thread through Derrida’s intricate treatment of the double struc-
ture of this signifying flyes,« I shall rely on the three intertwined motifs of flyes,«
flsignature,« and fllaughter.« As Derrida puts it (1991:590): fllaughter bursts out in
the event of signature itself. And there is no signature without yes.« The main
point of this account will be to address the aporetic flstructure« of this flyes,« which
is itself the aporetic condition that makes flthe event of signature« simultaneously
possible and impossible in so many complicated ways. But before I address the
figure of this flyes,« or explain what any of this has to do with laughter, I should
point out that this flevent of signature« encompasses multiple acts of signification
(DERRIDA 1991: 577, 586, 590). In the first place it refers to the act of flsigning« (as
inventing or making meaning, as giving out, or putting together fltexts« in the
broadest sense possible). The act of flsigning,« then, has at least a double sense. It
refers both to signing one’s so-called flproper« name (inventing the fltext« of one’s
own ego), and to signing as the act of configuring signifiers. Moreover, this act of
configuring signifiers also has a double sense; namely, flsigning« as the event (as-
sociated with the personal problems of proper names), of authoring texts I call
flmine,« and flsigning« as the event of configuring a string of signifiers, a text, that
I endeavour to make public as something not authored, but written (as standing by
itself in its own idiosyncrasy, which may not be that of an author’s own psychol-
ogy). In the second place, this flevent of signature« refers to flcountersigning« (as
interpreting, or reading given texts, as making sense of them).
Whether it describes psychological self-recognition (that applies to all of us,
as narrators of our own lived narratives, as egos or selves), the flauthor« who as-
signs her proper name to a text, or the text that stands in its own right, the flevent
of signature« repeats, across these differences, the same aporetic pattern of call
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and response. Hence the telephonic metaphorics that dominate the essay (DERRIDA
1991: 571-575). Derrida’s flfirst yes« refers to that instituting moment of inventive
signing in its multiple senses, when something is given out, whether this is an ego,
flmy« artwork, or the fltext« that writes itself through me. But he argues that this
so-called flfirst yes« is inherently (always already) a double flyes, yes.« For, as he
puts it (1991:576): flThe yes can only speak itself  if it promises itself to its own
memory…Yes must preserve itself, and thus reiterate itself, archive its voice in
order to give it once again to be heard and understood.« Further, this internal
contamination of the flfirst yes« by the repetition of a flsecond yes« engenders all
the problematic and aporetic figures of call and response, of instituting-invention
and recognizing-repetition, which leave us in a double bind. On Derrida’s account,
then, flyes« may be thought of as the constituted effect of a quasi-transcendental
condition; namely flrepetition.« The very condition that makes it possible to deter-
mine that the flfirst,« inventive, instituting or positing flyes« has occurred, namely
the recognizing, repeating flsecond yes,« threatens the flfirst yes« from within
(DERRIDA 1991:576).
Firstly, how does the flsecond yes« (or all subsequent flyeses,« to be more pre-
cise) make the flfirst yes« possible? To begin with, Derrida (1991:590-1;593) argues
that even the first inventive flyes,« which, in turn, calls for the second interpreta-
tive flyes,« is already itself a response. Implicitly, the flyes« of inventive positing —
the flyes« I am here, listening for a recognizing response, and ready to speak or
sign (ready to mean something to someone) — is already a response to a call. Re-
call Derrida’s earlier insistence that flinvention« has never meant creation ex nihilo,
but the recognition or uncovering of something already there (flwithout why«),
and itself calling out for inventive recognition. In confirmation here, he notes
(1991:593): flYes, the condition of any signature and any performative, addresses
itself to some other that it does not constitute.« In other words, before the flother«
as interpreter comes onto the scene, the inventive positing of something, the flfirst
yes,« already occurs in response to another call (of being, a god, justice, gift, or
whatever you want to name this) that is anterior to its instituting or inventive
performance. But if all inventive positing (this is me, this is it) is already implicitly
recognition of something, then the affirmative flsecond yes« of recognition must
already be implicit from the start in signing a flproper name« (in inventing who
one is, or what it is), even before the problematic call for repeated self-affirmation,
and for a recognizing response from the other.
In the second place, Derrida’s flfirst yes« functions only as a promise. In
Derrida’s words (1991:596): flWe cannot say yes without promising to confirm it
and to remember it, to keep it safe, countersigned in another yes.« It signifies that I
am here, ready and willing to mean, become, institute, or achieve something. That
is, the flfirst yes« functions as inventive positing, but only in the form of a potenti-
ality, an intended beginning of something, a gesture of institution, a promise, or a
projection. This inventive gesture, therefore, is not a matter of saying flyes« here I
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am/it is, already complete. Nor is it even a matter of positing something poten-
tially complete, which requires only the task of actualising this potentiality with
consistency and integrity. Rather, this flfirst yes« invents or posits anything, as a
kind of interminable fltelephonic spacing«: as inherently calling for, or desiring,
the repeated responsive affirmation at the other end of the line that ought to put
the seal on the integrity of the invention (but which, in principle, can never be
adequate to this task, making it impossible to terminate the call).
Further, if the interpreting flother« (which can also be the recognizing self in
self-reflection) does not enact, in the flsecond yes,« a response to the flfirst yes« that
recognises it as having been a flyes,« then the flfirst yes« never was a flyes.« As
Derrida (1991:593-594) puts it: flThe yes says nothing and asks only for another yes,
the yes of an other, which…is analytically — or by a priori synthesis — implied in
the first yes.« In other words, the flfirst yes« is internally structured (necessarily, a
priori) as a call for the recognizing response of the flsecond yes« (the recognition
that is the countersignature of an affirmative or understanding interpreter), and
the repeated affirmation of other flyeses« (from both myself and others), which
confer its identity, and without which it cannot be what it is (bearing in mind that
this determination is never total, for the flsecond yes« similarly, cannot be what it
is, without the recognizing affirmation of the third flyes,« and so on).
But, as Derrida shows, this call for recognizing repetition is highly problem-
atic, since it puts those involved in its movement (that is, both self and other) in a
double bind from which there is no clear-cut escape. What, then, is the internal
threat harboured in the flsecond yes«? Clearly the potentially inventive flfirst yes«
is vulnerable to the lack of repetition; that is, it is threatened in its very being by the
possibility that there may not be a flsecond yes,« in which case there will not have
been a flfirst yes« either. In this sense the ego/institution is threatened by schizo-
phrenia, or lack of temporal continuity (memory, history). In other words, the ego/
institution is threatened by a response to it that either does not re-cognise it at all,
or mis-recognises it in a way that violates it beyond the point of no return.
But if, on the contrary, the flfirst yes« is repeated in the flsecond yes,« and all
other flyeses« thereafter, faithfully, conscientiously and precisely as it was first
formed, then the flfirst yes« is also threatened by this very precision (DERRIDA
1991:576;579;588). If the subsequent flyeses« repeat the flfirst yes« as if mechani-
cally or compulsively (if, for example, I promise to marry without conviction and
subsequently go through all the conventional motions of being married quite con-
scientiously, but indifferently, thoughtlessly, or out of habit), then the flfirst yes« is
converted from being a fldecision« after which everything changes shape, into
merely the first of a programmable, predictable series of expected acts. In this way,
the flfirst yes« is delivered a fldeath threat« (the threat of stasis, sterility, or paraly-
sis). Were it to be construed as the first in a series of precise repetitions of the same
without end, the flfirst yes,« from its inception, would put an end to history, not to
mention change, novelty and surprise.
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So far, I have conferred all activity upon the recognizing response of the flsec-
ond yes,« as if the call for response implicit in the first (itself responsive) flyes« is
passive and helpless. But this flfirst yes,« as signed text, as itself call for response,
has its own powerful voice, which poses threats of its own to those who would
hear it (DERRIDA 1991:576;579;588). The flfirst yes,« even as it is itself flinventive,«
can become a force hell-bent on belittling, strangling or suffocating further inven-
tion, procreation or criticism insofar as it is posited as totalising, circumscribing, or
encyclopaedic; insofar as it imagines itself capable of already containing or pre-
programming every possible response; or insofar as it projects the kind of mastery
or omnipotence that denies mastery to the one who comes second. Derrida
(1991:578-9) has two kinds of projected omnipotence in mind here; namely the
Hegelian, which pretends to gather every possibility into the all-encompassing,
ultimately unitary, systematic maw of the dialectic, and the Joycean, which pre-
tends to have pre-empted or preprogrammed every possible associative link al-
ready accumulated and still to be acquired. He associates both of these with a
sarcastic or ironic laugh that reminds the others (the ones who come flsecond,«
and are bound to read or recognise) that they remain permanently under the shadow
of a debt they can neither escape nor pay off (DERRIDA 1991:587-8).
Here, then, is one way of putting the double double-bind: For there to be a
flliving« performance of the flfirst yes« at all, it has to be repeated or affirmed in a
recognizing response. But perfect repetition places this flyes« under the threat of
living-death. Repetition in the flsecond yes,« therefore, both necessarily constitutes
and threatens to destroy, the first flyes.« By the same token, for there to be living,
recognizing repetition at all, there must first have been a potentially inventive,
instituting flyes.« But the perfect priority of this first performed flyes« threatens to
suffocate the ones who come second under the weight of debt. The power for insti-
tutionalisation (the power to form a flhistory of effects« or tradition, as opposed to
being forgotten or passed over) that belongs to the flfirst yes,« therefore, both nec-
essarily constitutes and threatens to destroy the second flyes« (cf. DERRIDA
1991:580-1).
But if one cannot resolve this double bind by making a choice for or against
repetition or institution, how then, does one negotiate it? According to Derrida
(1991:589), one laughs a different kind of laughter. On the one hand, such negotia-
tion requires one to hear within the call of an instituted text, another tone of laugh-
ter that always haunts the derisive laugh of omnipotence and mastery. This is the
affirmative laugh of flthe gift,« which, unlike the castrating laugh of mastery, does
not cut down the power of commentary in advance, but instead cuts itself open,
gives itself out as a provocation, and dares the surprise in another reading (which
as a flreading« would still be, and yet is not, a repetition of the same).
On the other hand, such negotiation requires the one who comes second to
take advantage of the opening conferred by this gift, to embrace the paradox of
having to repeat the flfirst yes« differently. The second one must simultaneously
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respectfully recognise the flfirst yes,« and disrespectfully suspend it in order to re-
invent it, or to make anew the decision concerning a responsible response: that is,
a response that is still a recognition (and not a violation beyond the point of no
return), but which is, at the same time, not faithful to the point of death. In other
words, just like the flfirst yes,« the responsible response has to be both the flsecond
yes« that confers a certain flconventional« legitimacy and determinacy upon a flfirst
yes,« as well as an inventive flfirst yes« in its own right.
Quasi-Transcendental Thinking and Musicology
One important general implication of the quasi-transcendental thinking
sketched here with the aid of Derrida’s thought is that Derrida’s reinvention of
invention takes inventiveness out of any restrictive, specialised domain, be it aes-
thetics or technoscience, or (within the aesthetic domain), the traditionally sepa-
rated domains of inventive and interpretative activities. Speaking, for example, of
Ponge’s Fable, Derrida insists that it is difficult to be certain of its status as being
merely literary as opposed to, say, philosophical. But furthermore, he adds:
Nor could we be sure that its deconstructive structure cannot be found in other texts
that we would not dream of considering as literary. I am convinced that the same
structure, however paradoxical it may seem, also turns up in scientific and especially
in judicial utterances, and indeed can be found in the most foundational or institutive
of these utterances, thus in the most inventive ones (DERRIDA 1989:35).
Insofar as it turns up in musicology, the quasi-transcendental structure of
Derrida’s thinking suggests that there are no flnon-inventive« musicologists. Mu-
sicology is not merely a hermeneutic discipline that flcomes after« the music, and
remains eternally in debt to the artistic inventiveness of its geniuses. It is inventive
in its own right, and there are no musicologists who do not also in some sense
economically flproduce« or aneconomically flinvent« the music they apparently
only interpret. At the same time, there are no purely inventive composers: there
are no composers who do not also in some sense flinterpret« the music they appar-
ently only produce. In other words, first and foremost, Derrida’s pattern of think-
ing demonstrates that there is no basis in the invention/convention distinction for
the traditional belief that a musicologist’s sole task is merely the analytical inter-
pretation of musical compositions already so inventively brought into being by
composers. Since this is an attitude that neatly absolves musicology from the re-
sponsibility for cultural critique, the importance of this pattern of thinking for critical
musicology has to do with its power to address the dangers of ideological blind-
ness that are the result of placing musicologists and/or artists strictly on opposite
sides of the invention-convention coin.
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To begin with, this rigid positioning induces an ideological blindness that
will not recognize the inventiveness of so called conventional musicological inter-
pretation. Yet, musicologists might do well to question Kant’s distinction between
taste and genius, which accords them the secondary status of mere interpretative
parasites, since it ignores the extent to which it is the inescapably productive flsec-
ond yes« of the musicologist that co-constitutes the musical composition by recog-
nizing and validating it as flmusic,« rather than noise. Indeed, a musicology that
does not acknowledge and take account of its inventive-productive role in musical
composition remains susceptible to the ideological maintenance of the status quo,
for it would be unaware of the legitimising or authorizing power invested in this
hermeneutic process, and, therefore remain uncritical of its effects.
At the same time, granting the inventive-productive role that musicology in-
evitably plays in music-making, musicologists might do well to take note of Kant’s
distinction between theoretical and aesthetic judgments, and accept the aesthetic
character of the discipline. In this case, Derrida’s analysis of the invention-conven-
tion complex demonstrates clearly that a musicology aspiring to the ideals of flpro-
ductive« theoretical science (the kind proposed by Leibniz’s fluniversal character-
istics«) would become ideological in the sense that it aims to produce the flright«
kind of music, and ipso facto the flright« kind of musicologist, by programming
invention. In other words, it aims at a system (a teknè or mechanism) that would
exclude chance and change, construed as deviance, by determining or controlling
what artists may or may not do, and what musicologists may or may not discern.
Kant saw this danger, hence his distinction between theoretical judgment (which
was indeed determinative, and had to do with a closed-system of a priori knowl-
edge) and a posteriori aesthetic judgment (which, as reflective, was applicable in an
inherently open-ended system, and, therefore had to do with the necessarily fic-
tional projection of systematicity, orderliness or lawfulness, without system, order,
or law).
In other words, the inventiveness of musicological interpretation cannot be-
come restricted to a specific, traditional, productive methodology, which, after all
did not flfall from the sky« (as rational or natural law, or god-given revelation), but
is itself an invented, constructed, or fabricated hermeneutic approach (just one of
many possibilities) that has an origin and a history, and, therefore, can be changed.
In other words, to avoid the effects of ideological rigidity, the interpretative-in-
ventive task of musicologists amounts to more than methodologically guaranteed,
formal analysis of musical compositions.
Keeping in mind that the history of a discipline is predicated on the ongoing
possibility of generating novel statements about a certain field of inquiry, for mu-
sicology to exist as a fltraditional« discipline, a discipline with a history, it is im-
perative for musicologists to alternate, in turn, between a conventional and an
inventive approach to their discipline. As with any discipline, musicology inter-
mittently, from time to time, requires the challenge to be inventive, to approach
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flthe same« musical works or texts with a different mindset, a new conceptual or
hermeneutical framework, and a correspondingly novel set of analytical tools. By
producing in this way an instability or opening within the already instituted, fresh
answers may be yielded by familiar compositions. The quality of this yield, of
course, remains unpredictable. Yet, the alternative is to see the discipline founder
on the rocks of conventional exhaustion, mechanical repetition and analytical bore-
dom. For musicology to remain lively, it is important, without prediction or pro-
gramme, to give the new its chance.
Finally, if musicology as a discipline would gain in self-understanding by view-
ing its activity as deconstructive, the same applies in the domain of composition.
Composers never invent in a musical vacuum. Even if something novel comes to
mind in a flash of innovative genius, for this musical innovation to be recognizable
as an innovation (in the first place by the composer as interpreter), it has to be
comparatively assessed against the backdrop of a musical tradition already in place.
Moreover, as just mentioned, the inventive recognition of another interpreter is
required to make this innovation public. Yet, entirely conventionally formed mu-
sic is by definition ideological, since it verifies, legitimises and valorises the con-
ventions stabilized in a tradition (in a musical as well as a social sense), even un-
wittingly, simply through their repetition. Then again, to be inventive, that is, sub-
versive, musical composition cannot operate wholly outside what it aims to sub-
vert or transgress. Derrida offers an explanation of how subversion in creative
production might work-play as deconstruction. But this is also why attempts at
deconstructive subversion are inevitably commandeered by precisely what they
aim to subvert. Composers unaware of these entanglements easily remain suscep-
tible to the ideological maintenance of the status quo; hence the need for constant,
critical reinvention, as the modification and renewal of a tradition, marked by an
alternation of conventional continuity and inventive innovation.
REFERENCES
DERRIDA, Jacques. 1989. Psyche: Inventions of the other. In Reading de Man reading. Theory
and history of literature, Vol. 59. (L. Waters & W. Godzich, ed., C. Porter, trans.).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 25-65.
DERRIDA, Jacques. 1991. Ulysses gramophone: Hear say yes in Joyce. In A Derrida reader:
Between the blinds. (Peggy Kamuf, ed.). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 571-598.
KANT, Immanuel. 1987. Critique of judgment. (W. S. Pluhar, trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
178 A. HURST: DERRIDA’S QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL..., IRASM 36 (2005) 1, 159-178
Saæetak
KVAZI TRANSCENDENTALNA PROTKANOST INVENCIJE I INTERPRETACIJE
JACQUESA DERRIDAE
Tradicionalni i prividno oËit odnos prioriteta izmeu invencije i interpretacije koji, na
primjer, vlada Kantovom analizom odnosa izmeu ukusa i genija preËesto se koristi da bi
se podræalo tradicionalno vjerovanje da je jedini zadatak muzikologa tek drugorazredna
analitiËka interpretacija glazbenih kompozicija πto su ih veÊ tako inventivno umjetnici doveli
do postojanja. To je stav koji vjeπto iskljuËuje muzikologiju iz podruËja kulturne produkcije
i koji, kako se Ëesto pretpostavlja, razrjeπuje disciplinu odgovornosti kulturne kritike.
PosljediËno, muzikolozi riskiraju ideoloπku sljepoÊu koja moæe rezultirati smjeπtavanjem
teorijske discipline i stvaralaËkog rada toËno na suprotnu stranu flinventivno-konvencijske«
medalje.
Meutim, Derridaine dekonstrukcijske analize ‘paradoksalnih kategorija’, u kojima
su oba ova pojma povezana, pokazuje da njihova uzajamna kontaminacija Ëini u uæem smislu
‘invenciju’ i ‘interpretaciju’ nemoguÊima, i da stoga nema nikakva koherentnog temelja za
to tradicionalno razlikovanje ‘invencije’ od ‘konvencije’. LogiËka os Derridainih analiza ovdje
je tvrdnja da se odreeni pojmovi neizbjeæno odreuju u nekompatibilnim ali neobjaπnjivim
ekonomskim i neekonomskim iskazima. Derrida biljeæi da je tijekom povijesti ‘invencija’
kao pojam bila periodiËki ponovno izmiπljana, pomiËuÊi naglasak od neekonomskog smisla,
kao trenutnog nadahnuÊa povezanog s genijem, do ekonomskog smisla, kao produktivnog
otkriÊa tehnoloπkih sredstava. Kao πto ovo klizanje sugerira, neodredljivim ostaje odgovor
na pitanje ispravnog iskaza za odreenje ovog pojma. LaÊajuÊi se sloæene mreæe meusobno
povezanih razlika predloæenih za njegovo odreenje (na primjer, izmeu invencije i
dispozicije, genija i ukusa, izvornosti i ponavljanja, konvencije, dogaaja i pojave, sluËaja i
metode, institucije kao kreacije ili konstrukcije), Derrida pokazuje da se ekonomski i
neekonomski iskazi ne mogu strogo razluËivati. Pa ipak, njih se, dijalektiËki isprepletene,
ne moæe niti harmonizirati niti organizirati u hijerarhiju. Isto se tako ne moæe jedan iskaz
izvesti iz svekolike slike. Ukratko, ne moæe se oblikovati pojam invencije koji istodobno ne
bi bio kontaminiran svojim ‘drugim’, odnosno konvencijom (πto je tradicionalno podruËje
interpretacije).
Derridaina analiza interpretacije djeluje na vrlo sliËan naËin kako bi pokazala da se ne
moæe izdvojiti podruËje muzikoloπke interpretacije koje ne bi uvijek bilo kontaminirano
nekom inventivnoπÊu. Ono po Ëemu Ëitanje Derridae na tu temu Ëini zanimljivim jest da se
njegova sloæena logika, koja priznaje neizbjeænost paradoksa ili aporije i koja djeluje unutar
njegovih/njezinih ograniËenja, nudi kao moÊno orue za praksu kritiËke muzikologije.
